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It has been proposed that the potential procyclicality of Basel II could be 
alleviated by using through-the-cycle (TTC) ratings in IRBA models. A TTC 
rating would be based on the structural component of the debtor’s credit risk 
ignoring cyclical fluctuations. This paper tests for the existence of such 
fluctuations in corporate sector credit risk and finds vietually no evidence for their 
existence at the company level. It is not possible to assign satisfactory TTC 
ratings to debtors if there are no cyclical variations to be filtered out. 
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Suhdanteista riippumattomien luottoluokitusten 
toteuttamiskelpoisuus 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 14/2010 
Karlo Kauko 




On esitetty, että Basel II -säännösten mahdollista taipumusta voimistaa suhdanne-
vaihteluita voitaisiin lieventää käyttämällä suhdanteista riippumattomia luottoluo-
kituksia pankkien sisäisten luokitusten järjestelmissä. Suhdanteista riippumaton 
luokitus perustuisi velallisen luottoriskin rakenteelliseen komponenttiin: 
suhdanneluonteinen komponentti jätettäisiin huomiotta. Tässä keskustelualoittees-
sa testataan tämän suhdannekomponentin olemassaoloa. Yritystasolla sen 
olemassaolosta ei löydy juuri lainkaan näyttöä. Ei ole mahdollista antaa velallisil-
le tyydyttäviä suhdanteista riippumattomia luokituksia, jos luottokelpoisuudessa ei 
ole syklistä komponenttia, joka voitaisiin laskelmissa eliminoida. 
 
Avainsanat: suhdanteista riippumattomat luottoluokitukset, luottoriski, prosykli-
syys 
 
JEL-luokittelu: G21, G33, L16  
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In recent years the Basel II capital adequacy framework has been introduced in 
many parts of the world. A central feature of the new system is the use of internal 
ratings; many banks are allowed to determine the credit risk of each debtor by 
using their own internal ratings based approach (IRBA) models. It has been 
suggested that the system might amplify business cycles. During any recession 
credit risk tends to worsen, leading to higher capital requirements per exposure, 
which may diminish the supply of loans and possibly lead to a credit crunch, 
which would worsen the recession. This literature has been reviewed by Gordy 
and Howells (2006) and Drumond (2009). 
  A number of potential solutions to the procyclicality problem have been 
presented, ranging from countercyclical capital buffers to dynamic loan loss 
provisioning. Unfortunately there seems to be very little in-depth analysis on the 
feasibility and usefulness of the various proposed remedies. If the problem and its 
potential solutions are to be taken seriously, detailed analysis on these approaches 
is needed. 
  This paper intends to contribute to assessing one of the proposed solutions, 
namely Through-The-Cycle (TTC) rating methods and their feasibility. This paper 
tests the existence of the cyclical component of credit risk. There seems to be no 
consensus on the precise definition of TTC ratings, but Löffler (2004) has phrased 
and explicitly used a good conceptual framework. Using its analogue, changes in 
credit risk are hypothesised to consist of permanent structural changes and 
transitory cycles. TTC ratings are based on the structural component and ignore 
the cyclical component. If the mean-reverting cyclical component exists, and if it 
can be measured with acceptable accuracy almost on real time, TTC ratings can 
be calculated by eliminating the cyclical component from the perceived point-in-
time credit risk. 
  Rating agencies’ assessments are public, and they have been used in 
numerous contributions. These agencies often claim they present TTC ratings. 
Empirical evidence indicates that these ratings are slow to react to new 
information. (Altman and Rijken, 2005, Löffler, 2004) Otherwise, there seem to 
be relatively little literature on the time series properties of credit risk indicators at 
the debtor level, and there seems to be little or no evidence on the existence of 
transitory cycles in credit risk. 
  This paper uses a Merton (1974) type credit risk measure. The data have been 
provided by Moody’s KMV.
1 The data are interpreted as point in time (PIT) 
estimates of corporate credit risk. It is analysed whether these estimates are 
                                                 
1 These data have been relatively seldom used for research purposes, but a suitable data set on 
Finnish publicly listed companies was readily available for this project, and the data provider 
granted the authorisation to use it for research purposes.  
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subject to temporary cyclical variations that could be filtered out in order to get 
TTC estimates of credit risk. The results indicate that companies typically have 
got no persistent structural levels of credit risk. In some cases the behaviour of 
corporate credit risk during one phase of the cycle predicts its change during a 
following phase, but cross-company differences in cyclicality seem highly 
unstable over time; companies that suffered most from the previous recession may 
or may not improve their creditworthiness more than others during the following 
benign period. Cyclicalities may even be systematically reversed. Credit risk in 
small-cap firms has an observable tendency to revert to its past level, but no 
evidence on such regularity is found among large and medium size companies. 
Even among small-cap companies the tendency to reversion is not due to the 
hypothesised propensity of some companies to react particularly strongly to every 
upturn and downturn. Thus, TTC rating philosophies based on the idea of 
eliminating transitory cycles from the rating may not be fully feasible. 
  The long-term properties of aggregate credit risk cannot be directly derived 
from the credit risk of individual debtors. If the average credit risk in the economy 
were a unit root process, it could gradually migrate to any absurd extreme. 
However, simulations demonstrate that the average credit risk in the corporate 
sector may be stationary even though the credit risk of each individual company is 
a unit root process. This is possible because the population of companies is 
subject to continuous entry and exit. Exits through bankruptcy eliminate 
financially weak companies and prevents the average distance to default (DD) 
from declining indefinitely. Simultaneously, the entry of new companies prevents 
the average DD from increasing with no limits because entrants normally have a 
rather weak creditworthiness. If average credit risk is stationary, any deviation 
from the long term average is temporary, and can be regarded a ‘cycle’. 
  The second section describes the data. Econometric results, including unit 
root tests and various regression analyses, are presented in section three. The 
fourth section presents simulation results. The fifth section concludes and 





The raw data for the following analyses was provided by Moody’s KMV. These 
data are based on option pricing theory and the Merton (1974) model for 
corporate credit risk. The inputs consist of market capitalization of corporate 
equity, its historical volatility and corporate debt on the balance sheet. With these 
inputs it is possible to calculate the so-called distance-to-default (DD), which is 
simply the number of standard deviations between the value of assets and a 
critical threshold value related to corporate debt. In KMV data, the probability a 
company would end up in 12 months in a situation where its assets would fall 
below this threshold value is calculated by using an empirically fitted distribution. 
(Crosbie and Bohn, 2003) The DD is a point-in-time (PIT) measure of credit risk; 
no changes in DD are ignored as transitory and cyclical. In principle, the DD can 
be even negative in a working company; if assets appreciate in value, the 
company does not fail when the debt matures. 
  The predictive power of the method has been analysed in academic literature. 
Bharath and Shumway (2008) calculated their own data by using this 
methodology. To the extent it was possible to compare with available KMV data, 
differences were within reasonable limits. The authors concluded that the Merton 
model alone is not a perfect measure of credit risk, but its predictive power was 
clear. Rather similar results have been reported by Reisz and Perlich (2007); even 
though other models sometimes outperform the KMV method (or a close 
substitute for it, to be precise) in bankruptcy prediction, KMV type data have got 
strong predictive power. Li and Miu (forthcoming) concluded that the Merton 
model is particularly good at predicting bankruptcies among financially weak 
companies. These previous analyses are now taken as sufficient evidence on the 
relevance of the data. 
  The following analyses are carried out with monthly data on annual default 
probabilities of non-financial companies quoted on the Helsinki Stock Exchange. 
With the exception of banks and insurance companies, all the 119 firms with at 
least five years of data between August 1999 and December 2009 were included. 
Companies with shorter histories would hardly be of any use in the following 
analyses. Each observation corresponds to the last business day of the month. It 
might be interesting to extend the analysis to other countries or longer periods of 
time, but such data were not readily available to the author. Unfortunately, the 
sample is still relatively short for analysis on cyclical phenomena, but fortunately 
it describes a highly cyclical economy. During the sample period the annual 
growth rate of the real GDP in Finland ranged from -7.7 per cent in 2009 to +5.3 
in 2000; few advanced countries have experienced macroeconomic fluctuations of 
this magnitude. No other country in the euro area experienced a similar collapse 
of economic activity during the deep recession of 2009.  
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  Since 2006 companies listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange have been 
divided into large, mid-cap and small-cap companies. Because stock prices are the 
most important short-term driver of estimated default probabilities in the data, and 
because pricing inefficiencies can be particularly severe in the case of small-cap 
stocks (See Avramov, 2002, or Hung et al, 2009), some of the analyses are carried 
out either without small-cap companies or specifically for small-cap companies 
only. In the following, each company was classified according to its size category 
in early 2010. Companies that were not quoted in 2010 were classified by their 
2002 market capitalization. If the market cap was less than EUR 150 million, the 
company was classified as small; this threshold is the same as the one introduced 
by the Helsinki Stock Exchange in 2006. There are 60 companies in the small-cap 
category of the sample. 
  In the following analyses, a transformation is made for each observation. The 
DD that would under the normal distribution assumption imply the actual default 
probability reported by KMV is calculated. 
 
) EDF 2 ( 2 D ) D ( EDF it it it it Ψ =  − Φ =  (2.1) 
 
Where  Φ is the cumulative standard normal distribution, Ψ is the inverse 
complementary error function of the standard normal distribution and EDFit is the 
expected default frequency of company i month t reported by Moody’s KMV. The 
resulting Dit may not equal the underlying DD, but this proxy suits the purposes of 
this paper. 
  There seems to be almost no seasonal variation in DDs. When the first 
difference of Ds in the monthly panel data is explained with panel OLS with no 
other explanatory factors than month specific dummy variables, the overall fit of 
the regression is almost zero (R
2 = 0.01). 
  The most important short-term driver of credit risk in this model is the change 
in stock quotations. There is an ongoing debate on whether equity prices follow a 
pure unit root process, and whether temporary fluctuations can be identified in 
stock market data. (See eg Narayan and Narayan, 2007, Bali et al, 2008, Choe et 
al, 2007). Whatever the best answer to the question on the time series properties 
of stock quotations is, the result cannot be directly applied to credit risk implied 
by the KMV model because stock prices are not the sole driver of DDs. The 
Merton model is based on the assumption that firm assets follow a random walk 
until the predefined future date. Asset values are assumed to contain no transitory 
cycles, and no other factor is assumed to vary before the predefined date when the 
debt is assumed to mature. This does not necessarily imply the DD must follow a 
unit root process in any data that can be meaningfully analysed with the Merton 
method. In the real world numerous factors not related to changes in asset prices 
affect the default probability. Managers and shareholders would typically react to  
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different difficulties and opportunities by, for instance, expanding the 
undertaking, disposing of business units, issuing more equity capital to strengthen 
the solvency, adapting the dividend policy etc. For instance, it has been found that 
firms near credit rating upgrades or downgrades issue less debt relative to equity 
than firms not near a change in rating (Kisgen, 2006) and recently downgraded 
firms typically reduce leverage (Kisgen, 2009). Some typical patterns in the 
development of company credit risk may be due to managers’ reactions to 
exogenous shocks, some phenomena can be caused by something else. The 
combination of different drivers of credit risk creates a very complicated process. 
This highly complex system is now regarded as a black box; the focus of the 
following analyses is on the typical time series properties of credit risk, not on 




The following analysis is based on the analogue of Löffler (2004). The distance to 
default is hypothesised to be determined by the following process. 
 
it it it C S D + =  (3.1) 
 
where Dit is the point-in-time (PIT) DD of company i on the last day of the month 
t. Sit is the relatively stable structural through-the-cycle (TTC) component of the 
DD of the company i at the moment of time t. Sit follows a unit root process, is 
subject to infrequent abrupt shifts or remains constant, but does not undergo 
transitory cycles that would correlate with the macroeconomy. Cit is the cyclical 
component of credit risk. The cyclical component Cit is assumed to be stationary 
with mean zero, and to be highly correlated across firms. 
 
it t , macro i 1 it it C C C ε + Δ β + α = −  (3.2) 
 
where 0 < α < 1, the company specific cyclicality parameter βi is positive for most 
firms and εit is the idiosyncratic shock of the company i in period t. The macro 
level cyclical shock Cmacro,t has got mean zero and it is common to all firms, and it 
causes correlation in firms’ credit risks. The shock parameters may be 
autocorrelated. 
  A PIT rating would be based on Dit. A TTC rating would ignore the value of 
Cit by dropping off the whole component and focusing exclusively on Sit. 
Alternatively one might assign the cyclical component Cit a firm specific constant 
negative value to yield default probabilities under adverse conditions. The choice  
12 
between these approaches would affect the level of TTC default risk, not its 
variation over time. 
  The empirical predictions of this simple model can be briefly summarised as 
follows. 
 
1.  If structural changes of credit risk are not particularly commonplace, many 
companies have got stationary DDs because variations are entirely due to 
fluctuations of C. 
2.  Companies’ DDs should tend to revert to their past values; if the DD has 
increased in the past, it will probably decline in the future because some of the 
changes in DD are due to transitory fluctuations of C. 
3.  Companies’ reactions to cycles remain relatively constant. If the DD of a 
company deteriorates more than average during a recession, it will improve 
remarkably strongly during the following benign period because the company 
has got a persistently large value of βi. 
 
These empirical predictions will be tested in the following subsections. 
 
 
3.1  Unit root tests 
Panel unit root tests typically have got higher power than unit root tests on 
individual series (See Maddala and Wu, 1999, and references therein). However, 
serial correlation, especially negative one, may seriously bias many unit root test 
results (see Schwert, 1989, Hlouskova and Wagner, 2006). The ADF test can be 
applied, even though the presence of negative serial correlation accentuates the 
importance of lag length selection in unit root tests; the use of standard Akaike 
and Schwarz criteria would often lead to excessively short lag structures. (Ng and 
Perron, 1995, Lopez, 1997). The modified Akaike criterion is used in the 
following analyses. It takes into account the consequences of the potentially 
biased sum of autoregressive coefficients. Using the modified criterion 
significantly improves the reliability of unit root test results (Ng and Perron, 
2001). 
  Many panel unit root tests simply evaluate the joint significance of p-values 
obtained by testing each series separately. The null hypothesis is unit roots in the 
whole data, the alternative hypothesis being that at least some of the series are 
stationary. If most of the variation in credit risk is cyclical and if structural 
changes are not particularly frequent, it would be natural to expect that some 
subgroup of companies has not undergone any structural changes and the null 
hypothesis would be rejected. The common denominator of members of the 
stationary subgroup could be related to company size, industry or some non- 
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observable characteristics. However, as can be seen in table 1, these tests do not 
provide much evidence against the null hypothesis of unit roots in the whole data. 
Three different test statistics are reported. The Fisher ADF-approach applies the 
chi squared distribution to a function of logarithmic p-values of ADF tests on 
individual series. Choi (2001) proposed a Z-statistic of the significance of unit 
root tests. A test statistic based on averaging individual ADF test statistics has 
been presented by Im et al (2003). 
 
Table 1.   Panel unit root tests 
 
Panel unit root tests (levels) for 119 companies, modified Akaike criterion in lag length 
selection 
 
Method Test  statistic  p-value 
ADF Fisher Chi-squared, intercept, no trend  208.87  0.914 
ADF Choi Z stat, intercept, no trend  0.2086  0.583 
Im, Pesaran Shin W-stat, intercept, no trend  -0.0837  0.467 
 
 
Some interesting methods cannot be applied to panel data because there is no 
straightforward way to evaluate the joint significance of tests on individual series. 
Ng and Perron (2001) recommended a GLS detrending combined with the 
modified Akaike criterion in lag length selection when residuals are characterised 
by negative serial correlation. This method was applied to each company 
separately. It was found that in 16 cases out of 119 the unit root hypothesis would 
be rejected at the 10% level. The number is relatively high, and close to the upper 
boundary of what could still be considered a random outcome. On the other hand, 
there were only two companies for which the null hypothesis would be rejected at 
the 5% level, and in only one case it would be rejected at the 1% level. Hence, 
there is not much evidence against the hypothesis of unit roots in the underlying 
data generating process (see table 2). The results corroborate the findings of panel 
unit root tests reported in table 1. 
  The results discussed so far prove that the C parameter alone has not been the 
sole driver of credit risk in equation 3.1. Instead, a significant part of variation in 
credit risk must be due to changes in the structural component S. Even if there 
were only one major change in S, the methods applied so far would typically 
accept the null hypothesis of unit roots. Unit root tests that allow for the presence 
of a structural break were applied to the data. Following Lanne et al (2003), the 
analysis was begun by optimising the number of lags by running separate ADF 
analyses with individual intercepts and trends. The number of lags suggested for 
each company by the modified Akaike criterion was used at the following stages; 
these preliminary analyses were not used for any other purpose. As a second step, 
the date of the structural break was determined endogenously. A deterministic  
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component, consisting of constants and the shift caused by a structural break, was 
deducted from the original series by using a GLS procedure. The structural breaks 
were identified in two different ways, first by assuming an abrupt shift dummy in 
level and then by assuming a somewhat smoother exponential shift. Finally, the 
unit root test was run on residuals after deducting the deterministic component 
(see Saikkonen and Lütkepohl, 2002). Lanne et al (2002) tabulated critical values 
for the t-value of the lagged non-deterministic component of the original series. 
Again, each company was tested separately because there is no straightforward 
way to apply the method to panel data. As can be seen in the table 2, in most cases 
the number of rejections is fairly low at each significance level, and roughly equal 
to what one would expect as a random outcome, with the exception of the 
relatively high number of rejections at the 5% level with the smooth exponential 
shift. Hence, the number of structural shifts of credit risk seems much higher than 
one in the vast majority of companies. 
 
Table 2.   Unit root testing of company level distance 
     to  default 
 
Method Test  statistic  Nr  of 
rejections 








at the 1% 
level 
Ng-Perron – Elliot-Rothenberg-Stock 
(1996) test stat, Modified Akaike 
criterion, GLS detrending 
      
GLS detrending  Elliot-Rothenberg-
Stock (1996)  16*  2  1 
Shift in level, abrupt shift dummy  Lanne & al (2002)  13  5  0 
Shift in level, smooth exponential shift  Lanne & al (2002)  15  9*  1 
A star denotes that the probability of obtaining at least the reported number of rejections at the 
given significance level is less than 10%. In level shift tests the number of lags has been obtained 
for each company separately by running a separate ADF test with company specific tends and 
fixed effects. The number of lags proposed by the modified Akaike criterion was used in level 
shift tests reported above, in both determining the break date and unit root testing itself. 
 
 
3.2  Are there transitory credit risk fluctuations? 
The evidence presented in section 3.1 corroborates the hypothesis that credit risk 
at the firm level is a unit root process. These results do not necessarily prove the 
hypothesised cyclical component C of equation (3.1) is non-existent, or at least 
too weak to be detected. The structural component S may have undergone 
numerous irrevocable changes in most companies, but this does not imply the 
stationary C component cannot exist. 
  In order to shed some light on the possible tendency of DD figures to undergo 
transitory fluctuations, a few panel regressions were run with annual data. The  
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company level DD for each year is the three months simple moving average 
(Ďit = {Dit + Dit-1 + Dit-2}/3) of December. The analyses were carried out with data 
on the 117 companies for which it was possible to find data on six consecutive 
fourth quarters. Because the data does not seem stationary, the regression was run 
in differences. The annual difference of the distance-to-default was regressed on 
its past values. No weighting was applied. The results are presented in table 3. 
The first equation was run with no period or company specific effects. The 
Hausman test indicated that the random period effects model is more suitable than 
the fixed period effects model (Chi  sq  =  0.21), and the 3rd equation could be 
considered the main model for the whole data. The first, second and fourth lags 
are statistically significant. Thus, the DD is characterised by an observable 
tendency to return to its past level. 
 
Table 3.   Annual change of distance to default 
 
Explained variable Ďit – Ďit-12; Decembers only 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 































Constant 0.02  0.01  0.01  -0.02  -0.02  0.05  005 
 (0.2)  (1.3)  (0.1)  (-2.2)**  (-0.2)  (4.5)***  (0.6) 
Ďit-12 – Ďit-24  -0.07 -0.09 -0.09 -0.13 -0.13 -0.10 -0.10 
  (-0.7)  (-0.9) (-2.1)** (-1.0)  (-1.0)  (-1.2)  (-1.2) 
Ďit-24 – Ďit-36  -0.04 -0.09 -0.09 0.00  0.00 -0.17 -0.17 
 (-0.6)  (-2.1)**  (-2.2)**  (0.0)  (0.0)  (-4.6)***  (-4.8)*** 
Ďit-36 – Ďit-48  -0.16 -0.05 -0.05 -0.07 -0.07 -0.04 -0.04 
  (-1.9)*  (-1.7)*  (-1.3) (-1.2) (-1.3) (-0.7) (-0.7) 
Ďit-48 – Ďit-60  -0.14 -0.10 -0.09 -0.06 -0.06 -0.14 -0.14 
  (-3.9)***  (-2.6)***  (-2.7)*** (-1.3)  (-1.3) (-3.2)***  (-3.2)*** 
         
R2  0.04 0.39 0.02 0.51 0.02 0.31 0.05 
F  6.592*** 44.01*** 3.819*** 36.81***  1.75  13.857***  3.643*** 
N  624 624 624 330 330 294 294 
t-values corrected for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. 
* denotes 10% significance, ** 5% significance and *** 1% significance. 
 
 
Interestingly, the existence of the tendency to return to past values is related to 
firm size. There seems to be almost no evidence on the existence of temporary 
fluctuations in the data if small-cap firms are excluded from the sample. 
(Equations 4–5 in table 3). If, instead, the focus is on small-cap firms, the DD 
clearly tends to return to its past values (last two equations in table 3). It is 
difficult to say whether this is a genuine property of credit risk in small-cap firms  
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or something related to potentially inefficient pricing of small-cap companies on 
the stock exchange. There is almost no difference in the standard deviation of the 




3.3  Firm specific credit risk and the credit cycle 
In section 3.2 it was found that firm-specific DD has got, at least in small-cap 
firms, some tendency to return to its past level. This, however, does not prove the 
hypothetical cyclical component exists. By definition, cyclical fluctuations of DD 
in different companies should be highly correlated, and the existence of this 
correlation has not been tested. The macro level credit cycle is not directly 
observable but it affects the average credit risk in the economy. The figure 1 
presents the development of the mean of the DD. Its cross-sectional 25th and 75th 
percentiles and standard deviation are also presented in the figure. If anything, 
cross-sectional variation across firms has widened when credit quality has 
deteriorated. Spectral analysis found no satisfactory evidence on the existence of 
genuine cycles in the average. 
 
Figure 1.  The development of average DD and 




Irregular ‘cycles’ can be defined by identifying local minima and maxima in the 
sample. The period from one extreme of average credit risk to the next one is now 
called a phase. Using a simple version of the basic idea applied by eg Bry and 
Boschan (1971, p 16–29), peaks and troughs in the mean DD were defined by the 
following criterion. If an observation is greater or smaller than any of the 
following and preceding five observations, it is a turning point. If the original 
Bry-Boschan method were applied as such to this rather short sample, there would 
be hardly any turning points left because of numerous elimination criteria. In 
these analyses nothing but the extremes observed in April and June 2006 are 
eliminated because a two months phase is definitely too short to be a cycle. Local 
maxima can be identified in January 2000, March 2002, January 2004, and May 
2007. Local minima are found in September 2001, September 2002, August 2004, 
and March 2009. These results pass one compliance test proposed by Bry and 
Broschan: peaks and troughs alternate. These turning points are marked in figure 
1 by vertical lines. Moreover, December 2009 is rather arbitrarily classified a peak 
even though the data does not tell us how average credit quality developed 
thereafter. At least in quarterly data these fluctuations are closely correlated with 
the proxy for output gap;
2 the immediate correlation is +0.57. 
  If the business cycle sensitivity of each firm, the parameter βi in equation 
(3.2), remains broadly constant for lengthy periods of time, the development of 
credit risk during the previous phases of the cycle should be relevant to changes of 
credit risk during any future upturn or downturn. To take an example, the drastic 
deterioration of credit risk between May 2007 and March 2009 should have been 
stronger among cyclical companies that experienced particularly strong 
improvements of creditworthiness during the preceding benign phase. 
  A number of cross-sectional OLS analyses were run. The change in the DD of 
each company was regressed on the change of DD of the same company during 
the two previous phases irrespective of the number of months the phases lasted. If 
the hypothesised persistent cyclicality exists, the change of DD during the 
previous phase should obtain a negative regression coefficient because each 
upturn is, by definition, always followed by a downturn, and vice versa. 
Analogically, the change lagged by two phases should obtain a positive 
coefficient. OLS results of cross-sectional analyses on the whole sample are 
presented in table 4. In three cases out of seven the first lag has got a statistically 
significant negative coefficient, as hypothesised. Two coefficients of the second 
lag have got the expected positive sign that would be significant at the 5% level, 
and two of them have got a statistically significant negative sign, which is 
inconsistent with the hypothesis to be tested. Out of the seven significant 
coefficients five have got the expected sign and two the ‘wrong’ sign, which 
                                                 
2 The output gap was calculated as the Hodrick-Filter residual (λ = 1600) run on logarithmic real 
GDP data for the period Q1/1995–Q4/2013; the data after Q3/2009 were those of the latest Bank 
of Finland macroeconomic forecast.  
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would not be particularly unlikely if the signs were assigned randomly. The 
average of both coefficients is low, about -0.15 for the first lag and -0.02 for the 
second. With the exception of the latest upturn, the R squared values are low. 
 
Table 4.   Cross-sectional OLS analyses on identifiable cycles – 
      Change of DD as a function of its past changes 
 
Whole sample – all the phases  Explanatory variables 












Mar09-Dec09 Upturn  0.189  0.009  -0.307  -0.047 0.36  28.41*** 
 9  months    (0.2)  (-6.3)***  (-0.8)     
May07-Mar09 Downturn  -0.648  -0.674  0.172  0.533  0.06  3.43** 
 22  months    (-9.6)***  (1.6)  (2.7)***    
Aug04-May07 Upturn  0.446  0.533  -0.092  -0.237 0.04  2.22 
 33  months    (9.6)***  (-0.6)  (-2.0)*     
Jan04-Aug04 Downturn  -0.099  -0.049  -0.155  -0.133  0.06 3.59** 
 7  months    (-1.6)  (-3.0)***  (-2.0)**     
Sept02-Jan04 Upturn  0.404  0.405  -0.447  -0.323  0.16  10.21*** 
 16  months    (10.42)***  (-4.6)***  (-2.2)**     
March02-
Sept02 
Downturn -0.099  -0.021  -0.183 0.100  0.08  3.92** 
6 months    (-0.5)  (-1.3)  (2.3)**     
Sept01-
March02 
Upturn 0.126  0.120  -0.011    0.00  0.14 
6 months    (4.9)***  (-0.4)       
Heteroscedasticity consistent (White) t-values in parentheses 
* denotes 10% significance, ** 5% significance and *** 1% significance. 
 
 
Some of the explanatory variables may lack statistical significance because they 
describe the development of credit risk during a very stable phase, when the DD 
in different companies has been driven almost exclusively by something else than 
non-existent cyclical forces. Analogically, if the explained variable corresponds to 
a very stable period, changes in DD of most companies are mainly due to factors 
that have little to do with cyclicality. In the cross-sectional OLS analyses 
presented in table 5, it is tested whether firm specific changes in DDs during the 
strongest cyclical swings are related to changes during previous accentuated 
phases. Phases where the absolute value of the average of DDs has changed less 
than by 0.3 are excluded as both explanatory and explained variables. As can be 
seen, there is little evidence on the existence of persistent differences in 
companies’ cyclicalities. As hypothesised, the upturns in September 2002 – 
January 2004 and August 2004 – May 2007 were stronger in companies that were 
affected particularly severely by the downturn in January 2000 – September 2001. 
Instead, the statistical relationship between the upturn in September 2002 – 
January 2004 and the upturn in August 2004 – May 2007 is inconsistent with the 
permanent cyclicality hypothesis. Companies that benefited particularly strongly  
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from the first upturn benefited less than others from the second one, which is 
inconsistent with the hypothesis that persistent differences in cyclicalities exist. 
Interestingly, this reverted relationship has the largest coefficient of the whole 
table. The most dramatic phase of the sample, namely the collapse in 2007–2009, 
is not related to previous strong phases. 
 
Table 5.   Cross sectional OLS, strong phases only 
 
Explained variable  Average 
value 
Explanatory variables 
Di end-of-phase – 


















May07-Mar09 Downturn  -0.687  -0.76  0.06  -0.02  -0.09  0.01  0.37 
 22  months    (-5.8)*** (0.4)  (-0.9)  (-0.9)     
Aug04-May07 Upturn  0.428  0.50    -0.42  -0.17  0.14  7.36***
 33  months    (9.2)***    (-3.8)*** (-2.0)**     
Sept02-Jan04 Upturn  0.394  0.28      -0.22 0.15  17.42***
 16  months    (8.0)***      (-4.0)***     
t-values corrected for heteroscedasticity (White). 
Averages of the explained variable may differ from table 4 because samples may differ. 
* denotes 10% significance, ** 5% significance and *** 1% significance. 
 
 
One possible explanation to these phenomena may be the existence of several 
underlying drivers of credit risk. For instance, if the deterioration of credit quality 
is due to rising interest rates but the subsequent recovery is due to strong export 
demand, the latter effect may mainly benefit companies that did not suffer much 
from the preceding negative shock. The upturn in 2002–2004 may be due to the 
reversion of the factor that caused the downturn in 2000–2001. The upturn in 
2004–2007 may have been caused by some other forces but counteracted by the 
reversion of factors that contributed to improving credit quality in 2002–2004. 
Even though the Basel II framework is based on the Asymptotic Single Risk 
Factor approach (See Basel Committee, 2005), Koopman et al (2009) found 
evidence on the workings of multiple drivers of rating transitions after controlling 
for observable macroeconomic factors. This finding has been corroborated by 
Jiménez and Mencía (2009) with data on actual defaults in different sectors. The 
hypothesis of multiple drivers of credit risk in KMV data was tested with factor 
analysis. Four principal components were extracted from the monthly differences 
of Ds in the period September 1999 – May 2007. The estimated loadings to these 
four factors were used as explanatory variables in a cross-sectional OLS analysis. 
The explained variable was the deterioration of distances to default in the May 
2007 – March 2009 period. Only one set of factor loadings was a statistically 
significant explanatory variable at the 5% level. Thus, the multiple factor  
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hypothesis found no support in this rather simple test. Detailed results are 
available from the author upon request. 
  Cycles of different companies might be imperfectly synchronised; each 
company may react to the same macroeconomic factors but some of them may 
react faster than others. The most extreme phase of the whole data, ie the financial 
crisis of 2007–2009, and the preceding lengthy benign period were analyzed in 
order to test this hypothesis. Each extreme value is the highest or lowest monthly 
value observed during a certain period of time. The extremes of DD for each 
company i are defined as follows. 
 
– Di crisis = Min[Di Nov 2008 ... Di Sept 2009] 
– Di peak = Max[Di Jan2007...Di Nov 2007] 
– Di pre-peak = Min[Di Jan 2004 ... Di Dec 2006] 
 
These data were used to calculate differences Di crisis – Di peak, and   
Di peak – Di pre-peak. One would expect that there must be a highly negative 
correlation between these differences because cyclical companies experienced the 
strongest improvement before the crisis and the worst collapse during it. 
Interestingly, the correlation between these variables is non-significant and, 
against expectations, positive (+0.12, N = 108). 
 
 
3.4 Cyclicality  or  idiosyncratic variation in small-cap 
companies? 
In section 3.2 it was found that the DD of a typical small-cap firm is characterised 
by a certain tendency to return to its past level. This property might be related to 
cyclicality. Hence, table 4 regressions were run for the sub-sample of small-cap 
firms. As can be seen in table 6, the results are largely similar to those observed in 
the whole sample. In some cases the first lag is statistically significant and obtains 
the expected sign. However, the second lag has got the ‘wrong’ negative sign 
more often than the ‘correct’ positive sign irrespective of whether insignificant 
coefficients are ignored or not, which is clearly inconsistent with the hypothesis of 
persistent differences of companies’ cyclicalities. 
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Table 6.   Cross-sectional OLS analyses on identifiable cycles – 
      Change of DD as a function of its past changes 
 
Small cap firms – all the phases  Explanatory variables 












Mar09-Dec09 Upturn  0.160  0.07  -0.20  -0.03  0.13 3.6*** 
 9  months    (1.4)***  (-3.2)***  (-0.4)     
May07-Mar09 Downturn  -0.494  -0.42  0.00  0.58  0.06  1.49 
 22  months    (-4.9)  (0.0)  (2.0)**     
Aug04-May07 Upturn  0.465  0.61  0.02  -0.33  0.08  2.33 
 33  months    (6.8)  (0.0)  (-2.3)**     
Jan04-Aug04 Downturn  -0.115  -0.05  -0.18  -0.20  0.18 6.0*** 
 7  months    (-1.4)  (-3.2)***  (-2.7)***     
Sept02-Jan04 Upturn  0.429  0.44  -0.47  -0.37  0.15  4.6** 
 16  months    (8.2)***  (-3.1)***  (-1.6)     
March02-
Sept02 
Downturn -0.099 -0.04  -0.11  0.08 0.05 1.12 
6 months    (-0.8)  (-0.7)  (1.4)     
Sept01-
March02 
Upturn 0.085  0.08  -0.01    0.00  0.14 
6 months    (2.5)  (-0.4)       
Heteroscedasticity consistent (White) t-values in parentheses. 
* denotes 10% significance, ** 5% significance and *** 1% significance. 
 
 
The analysis on strong phases was repeated with the sub-sample of small cap 
companies. As can be seen in table 7, the results are largely similar to those of 
table 5; two of the three strong fluctuations are partly explained by previous ones, 
but the coefficients do not always obtain the ‘correct’ signs. The strongest phase 
of the sample, namely the downturn in 2007–2009, is not correlated with previous 
strong phases. 
 
Table 7.   Cross-sectional OLS analyses 
 
Small Cap companies – strong phases only 
 
Explained variable    Explanatory variables 
Di end-of-phase – 


















May07-Mar09 Downturn  -0.519  -0.47 0.02 0.15 0.19  0.07  0.82 
  22  months   (-3.2)*** (0.1) (0.6) (1.6)    
Aug04-May07 Upturn  0.420  0.56    -0.58  -0.17  0.25  6.47***
 33  months    (6.3)***    (-3.6)*** (-1.9)*     
Sept01-Jan04 Upturn  0.419  0.26      -0.25 0.20  10.40***
 16  months    (3.5)***      (-3.2)***     
t-values corrected for heteroscedasticity (White). 
Averages of the explained variable may differ from table 6 because samples may differ. 
* denotes 10% significance, ** 5% significance and *** 1% significance.  
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4  Stationarity at the aggregate level – simulations 
The section 3 demonstrated that instead of being stationary, firm-specific credit 
risk has probably got a unit root. If the distance-to-default of every company is a 
unit root process, we might draw the conclusion that the average credit risk in the 
economy should also be a unit root process. Companies’ average default 
probability might gradually migrate to 99,9 per cent, or the economy might end up 
in a situation where corporate bankruptcies are unheard of. These extreme 
alternatives do not seem realistic. 
  In principle, the average of a large number of unit root processes could be 
stationary in the presence of a suitable cointegration. This possibility is not 
realistic in this case; the long-term correlation between firms should be negative. 
It is difficult to see which forces would cause a negative relationship between the 
default probabilities of two companies in entirely different industries. A more 
plausible explanation is related to continuous entry and exit. Only those 
companies that exist at a given moment of time are included in the average. 
  In order to draw some conclusions on the implications of this way of thinking, 
a number of simulations were run. The oldest company of the sample in section 3 
was 360 years old in 2009. Taking this as the starting point in model calibration, 
simulations were run for 360 consecutive ‘years’. During each period t a number 
of new companies were established. The number of start-ups (Nt) grows in a 
growing economy. The number of new start-ups in period t is determined by a 
very simple function. 
 
) 025 . 1 ( Round 5 N
1 t
t
− =  (4.1) 
 
In total, 1 450 645 companies were established in each simulation, about 91,5% of 
them during the last 100 ‘years’. The distance-to-default develops as a unit root 
process, unless the firm fails. 
 
it 1 it it D D ε + = −  (4.2) 
 
where  εit is an iid normally distributed random variable with mean zero and 
standard deviation 0.198. This standard deviation was calibrated to produce the 
cross-sectional standard deviation of the ten year difference (December 1999, 
December 2009) in section 3 data. In order to save computing capacity, it was 
assumed that firms of the same cohort can be divided into 5 groups of equal size. 
Companies in the same group are always identical and they are assigned the same 
distance-to-default. Each group i of start-ups is assigned the distance-to-default 
1.33 + εit. Firms’ DDs change already before the first possible moment of 
bankruptcy at the end of the entry period. The parameter value 1.33 was calibrated  
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to produce the observed five-year survival rate of newly established Finnish firms, 
which is reported by Nurmi (2004, p. 40) to be slightly less than 60%. 
  Firms do not exit in any other way than through bankruptcy. Each year t the 
firms of the group i exit iff 
 
it it R ) D ( < Φ  (4.3) 
 
Where Φ is the cumulative standard normal distribution and Rit is an evenly iid 
distributed random variable between 0 and 1. A firm may exit even during the 
same year it is established. 
  The first 260 ‘years’ were discarded and nothing but the last 100 moments of 
time were used in subsequent analysis. The average distance-to-default was 
calculated for each year taking into account nothing but firms that had been 
established but not failed by the end of the year. This simulation was repeated a 
hundred times, producing a panel of ten thousand observations on average DD in 
the artificial economy. These time series converge towards an equilibrium where 
the average DD seems constant. The mean DDs was 1,86 for the first observation 
(t = 261) and 1,87 for the last observation (t = 360). 
  The panel unit root test proposed by Levin et al (2002) suits the setting 
particularly well. The method assumes that series of the sample are identical with 
respect to the first-order partial autocorrelation, but other parameters can vary 
across units. The null hypothesis is that each time series of the panel has got a unit 
root, the alternative hypothesis being that none of them have. As pointed out by 
the original authors (p. 18), the method is of limited use unless the time series are 
free from contemporaneous correlation and identical with respect to the presence 
of a unit root. Because of the nature of the data generating algorithm these criteria 
should be satisfied in the artificial sample. The model applied in the following is 
numbered 2 by Levin, Lin and Chu (LLC); each time series has got its own 
intercept, but no trends are allowed in the data. It can be essentially important to 
choose the right bandwidth, a parameter value used in correcting test statistics for 
serial correlation. Westerlund (2009) tested with Monte Carlo simulations 
different details concerning the use of the LLC test. He strongly recommended the 
use of the bandwidth selection criterion Ki = 3.21T
(1/3). The lag length selection 
criterion proved to be of secondary importance. The Schwarz-Bayesian lag length 
selection criterion was one of the methods considered by Westerlund whereas the 
modified Akaike criterion was not; results based on both criteria are reported in 
table 8. Moreover, the results of panel ADF were calculated for comparison. 
These methods unanimously reject the unit root hypothesis. 
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Table 8.   Unit root tests on average DD in artificial 
     panel  data 
 
 Stat  P-value  Lag  selection 
criterion 
Levin-Lin-Chu 2002 (LLC)  -15.09  0.0000  Schwartz-Bayesian 
Levin-Lin-Chu 2002 (LLC)  -7.56  0.0000  Modified Akaike 
Panel-ADF; Fisher chi squared  511.82  0.0000  Modified Akaike 
Panel-ADF; Choi Z-stat  -11.47  0.0000  Modified Akaike 
The LLC test was run with the Bartlett kernel, the bandwidth criterion 
Ki = 3.21T
(1/3); No trends are included 
N = 100; T = 100 
 
 
The relative stability of the average DD is due to the balance between two 
counteracting forces. The average distance-to-default among surviving firms of 
each cohort increases over time when disproportionate exit takes place among 
firms whose DD has deteriorated, or not improved enough to promise a long life. 
Simultaneously, the relative weight of each cohort steadily declines even if no exit 
takes place because increasing numbers of new firms enter. In real life, exit may 
take place even without bankruptcy and default, for instance because of voluntary 
closures due to non-economic factors, such as retirement of the entrepreneur, or 
M&A. Hence, the long-term forces that would force the average DD upwards are 
counteracted by multiple factors. 
  This way of thinking offers a possible explanation to the observed propensity 
of newly established firms to fail at a higher probability than seemingly similar 
older firms. An old firm must have survived for many years to be observed, which 
is unlikely unless the firm has developed a low probability of default soon after 
entry. This reasoning is essentially the same as the one presented by Thompson 
(2005) who argues that high exit rates are commonplace among new firms 
because this group includes a lot of companies that were established with an 
inherently high failure probability, which is unlikely in the case of firms that have 




It has been proposed that the presumed procyclicality problem of Basel II could 
be alleviated by using through-the-cycle (TTC) ratings in banks’ IRBA models. 
Many discussions on this possibility are not based on any explicit assumptions on 
the nature of business and credit cycles and their mutual interactions. However, 
the feasibility of TTC ratings depends on the time series properties of credit risk at 
the debtor level. There is relatively little literature on this topic, but this paper has  
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presented some empirical evidence on this issue. The original KMV data provided 
by Moody's was used to calculate monthly proxies for distance-to-default (DD) of 
119 Finnish publicly listed companies. The DD seems to follow a unit root 
process in most companies and few if any firms have got an equilibrium value of 
credit risk that would remain constant for lengthy periods of time. In the case of 
small-cap firms, some tendency to reversion to previous levels of credit risk can 
be observed. However, this serial correlation among small-cap firms is of little use 
in eliminating the cyclical component of credit risk in banks’ capital adequacy 
calculations because these transitory fluctuations seem idiosyncratic rather than 
cyclical. Little evidence on the existence of regular transitory cyclical fluctuations 
of credit risk was found at the company level. The cyclicality of a typical 
company seems highly unstable and varies from cycle to cycle. Thus, TTC rating 
philosophies based on the idea that transitory cycles must be filtered out do not 
seem fully feasible. 
  Another often used definition of TTC ratings combines the current credit risk 
with its perceived sensitivity to the macroeconomic environment. If two debtors 
are characterised by equal probabilities of default at the moment, the company 
with a higher sensitivity to business cycles would be given a weaker credit rating. 
Emphasising this vulnerability in credit quality should be possible, provided it is 
possible to estimate the sensitivity of different debtors. Unfortunately, it was 
found in section 3.3 that the cyclicality of the creditworthiness of a typical 
company undergoes frequent and fundamental changes. Firms that were strongly 
affected by the previous stage of business cycles can suddenly become almost 
insensitive to the macroeconomic environment, and vice versa. This does not 
prove it must be impossible to distinguish cyclical companies from non-cyclical 
ones. Instead, it was simply found that historic correlations are of little use in 
assessing this vulnerability. 
  Some of the findings in section 3 could be consistent with the hypothesis of 
multiple credit risk drivers. Some earlier contributions (Koopman et al, 2009, 
Jiménez and Mencía, 2009) have found evidence in favour of this hypothesis but 
the simple analysis mentioned in section 3.3 found no evidence to support it. This 
analysis was by no means exhaustive. Applying sophisticated factor analysis 
techniques and different rotations to the same data set might be an interesting way 
to expand the analysis and a satisfactory explanation to the irregular changes of 
companies’ cyclicalities might be found. However, the Basel II framework is 
based on the Asymptotic Single Risk Factor approach, and it may not be obvious 
how to take into account different factor loadings in order to calculate TTC 
ratings in Basel II compliant IRBA models. 
  Even though companies’ credit risks seem unit root processes, the simulations 
of section four demonstrate that the average credit risk of a representative loan 
portfolio may be stationary and therefore subject to transitory fluctuations. This 
paradox is explained by the entry and exit of debtors. Hence, it would be possible  
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to make a cyclical adjustment to the portfolio after calculating the credit risk at the 
debtor level, at least if the portfolio is subject to a same kind of entry and exit of 
firms as the artificial economy of section four. On the other hand, it is not obvious 
why it would be useful to calculate the credit risk of each debtor by using highly 
sophisticated methods, and then to apply a coefficient that prevents the variation 
of the capital requirement. Choosing a suitable constant risk weight for the whole 
portfolio would yield the same capital requirement with much less work. A 
somewhat more sophisticated way to implement TTC ratings is to apply 
smoothing at the rating category level. Potential debtors can be ranked according 
to their PIT credit risk, and they can be assigned ratings according to the credit 
risk relative to other debtors. The number of debtors in each category is held 
broadly constant by tightening criteria during cyclical upturns and loosening them 
during downturns. The risk weight of each rating category is held constant 
irrespective of how the actual default probability of the category develops. This 
approach was tested in the simulations by Gordy and Howells (2006); they 
concluded that the cyclical behaviour of capital requirements under this TTC 
rating system depends on the cyclical development of banks’ policies concerning 
new lending. However, it can be argued that even under this more sophisticated 
smoothing one runs the risk of making complicated calculations in order to obtain 
a predefined, exogenously given result. If half of the loan portfolio is always 
assigned the weight 1.2, and the other half the weight 0.8, the average risk weight 
obviously cannot differ from 1. It would be more meaningful to use all would-be 
borrowers in the economy as benchmark when debtors are assigned ratings, but 
the bank may have got limited access to the required information set. 
  Previous empirical literature has not reached a clear consensus view on the 
time series properties of the development of real GDP. Nelson and Plosser (1982) 
questioned the traditional view of GDP growth as a trend stationary process. 
Some authors claim that output grows as a unit root process whereas some others 
have reached the conclusion that long-term economic growth is a trend-stationary 
process (see Beechey and Österholm, 2008). Moreover, there may be structural 
breaks in the development of GDP (Papell and Prodan 2004). The answer to the 
question on trend stationarity vs unit root may depend on the era and the country 
(Gaffeo et al, 2005). Interestingly, this literature is not often referred to in 
analyses on through-the-cycle ratings even though the credit cycle is almost by 
definition related to macroeconomics. Even though Koopman et al (2009) 
concluded that the statistical relationship between credit risks and macroeconomic 
variables appears weak, there must be some connection between the behaviour of 
real output and the credit risk of the corporate sector which produces most of the 
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